The US Attack on Iran Was Wrong
As a preventive strike, the US's action was immoral and makes us less safe.
Over the weekend, the US bombed three locations in Iran associated with its nuclear program. The goal of the attacks was to destroy that program and in turn stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Of course, it would be bad for Iran to have nuclear weapons. But contrary to what some claim, it is highly unlikely that Iran would use those weapons offensively. They are desirable to Iran as a deterrent against attacks like those it has been enduring from Israel—and now the US—for over a week now. (I’d like to remind everyone how confident many were in the early 2000s that North Korea must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons because it would surely use them offensively. North Korea now has at least 50 such weapons and I don’t hear much anxiety about them launching a sudden nuclear attack.)
There is also little evidence to support Israel’s and the US’s claim that Iran has recently made a sudden push to complete development of nuclear weapons.
So, there is no good reason to think Iran’s nuclear program posed an imminent danger to Israel or anyone else. It’s a danger, sure. But it’s a possible danger sometime in the future.
This puts the US’s attack in the category of a preventive strike. Preventive war is carried out to thwart a future, but not yet material, threat of attack. It is different from war aimed at thwarting an imminent threat or an unfolding assault. It is one thing to go to war when a foreign power is currently invading or plans to invade tomorrow. It is another thing to go to war when a foreign power is developing military technology that would make an invasion easier sometime in the future. In the first case, there is a known intent to attack now. In the second, there is no intent to attack now or even in the future; the threat is only notional. This is what makes preventive war unlike straightforwardly defensive war.
Preventive war can be very tempting to hegemonic powers. If you are the strongest state on the continent, you are in a position to use your power to stop the other states from acquiring power that might challenge you. To maintain your power and the perception of security that comes with it, you may want to use your military dominance to engage in preventive war. Wars of this kind are common in human history.
Preventive wars also often end up being much more destructive than their instigators anticipate. Sparta started the Peloponnesian War as a preventive endeavor against Athens’ rising power. It turned into a massive, years-long imbroglio that Sparta, though ultimately victorious, never recovered from. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor as a preventive strike to change the balance of power in the Pacific. We know how that turned out. And there are many historians who view WWI as a product of misguided preventive war thinking.
Preventive war used to be highly controversial in the US. As my former colleague at West Point, Scott Silverstone, has shown, before the end of the Cold War, preventive war was considered obviously wrong by the US foreign policy establishment. After the fall of the Soviet Union, and especially after 9/11, the US became more amenable to preventive war.
Indeed, the very thing known today as the “Bush Doctrine” is a quasi-preventive justification for war. This doctrine was the primary rationale for invading Iraq. The disasters that this policy led to, I had thought, showed Americans how dangerous it is. I’m surprised and dismayed by the absence of commentary on the Trump administration’s resurrection of the preventive war doctrine.
What’s wrong with preventive war? The common answer is that it violates state sovereignty. According to international law and ordinary assumptions about the rights of states, it is wrong to forcibly interfere with the domestic affairs of other states. All states—weak and strong—have the right to not be interfered with militarily. So, a preventive war is wrong because states have the right to gain power, including military power, even if we don’t like it. As long as they are not currently or imminently violating the sovereignty of other states, attacking them, even if it would reduce the risk of war with them in the future, is a violation of their rights.
Now, it is notoriously hard to find a sound philosophical basis for the idea that all states have an equal right to sovereignty. Many have tried. We might appeal to the idea of a social contract—but then what about states that don’t seem to have any meaningful ‘contract’ with their people? We might appeal to the rights of communal bodies like nations—but then what about states that repress national minorities within their territory? At best, it seems we could come up with a theory that grounds sovereignty for some states, but certainly not all.
But I think there is a powerful reason to ground state sovereignty, at least against military action, by appealing not to the nature of states but to the nature of international relations without a global government. There are rules of conduct for this arena that we should follow not (entirely) because they abide by the inherent rights of those in it, but (also) because they help structure it to everyone’s benefit.
The problem with preventive war is that it embodies a standard for the resort to war that is dangerously permissive. A world where states can go to war, not when they are under imminent threat, but merely because they believe they have the power to defeat others they are in competition with, is a very dangerous world. Even if a given instance of preventive war proves to reduce the risk of a greater conflict later, the problem is that it sets a precedent for all states to go to war merely because they believe it will prevent some future danger. If preventive war is permissible for you, then it is permissible for everyone else. Your enemies can now more easily engage in preventive war too. The doctrine of preventive war, viewed globally, does not prevent war; it enables war.
It is possible, but far from certain, that the attacks on Iran have meaningfully set back Iran’s pursuit of nuclear bombs and that they will not lead to a wider war in the region. Nevertheless, by endorsing the doctrine of preventive war, the US enables Iran along with every other state to appeal to the same doctrine to justify attacking others. Iran can now appeal to the same doctrine to defend its support of Hezbollah and Hamas. Russia can now deflect criticism of its invasion of Ukraine by saying they are merely adopting the same policy the US embraces. And China can now more easily justify invading Taiwan. America has done its bit to make the world accepting of preventive war. The consequences of this are far-reaching and make everyone less safe.
This is why I think the US’s strikes on Iran were wrong. In carrying out these attacks, the US has endorsed the doctrine of preventive war. The world is now a more dangerous place as a result.
Spot on. These are my feelings on the matter exactly. The only thing I could take exception to is your assertion that there has been a lack of commentary on Trump’s decision to resurrect the Bush Doctrine. Perhaps mainstream commentators haven’t taken notice, but many of my Trump supporting friends (and Substackers) have taken note and are decidedly unhappy about it.
Thanks your contribution on this matter. I appreciate the thoughtful insight from a West Pointer.